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1. Introduction
Substantial and lasting reductions, if not complete eradication, of poverty has been and will continue
to be the ultimate goal of economic and social development.  The achievement of this goal has,
however, so far eluded virtually all of Sub-Saharan Africa as well as many other countries in the rest
of the developing world.  Recent research and development experiences suggest that sufficiently
high and sustained growth is a prerequisite for meaningful, and hopefully irreversible, impact on
poverty.  However, careful analysis of historical growth processes across the world reveals that
records of sustained and sufficiently deep growth have been the exception rather than the rule
(Easterly et al, 1993).  Moreover, even when growth happens, its impact on poverty is not automatic.
The efficiency of growth in terms of poverty reductions, as well as its sustainability over time,
depend on the extent of inequality. Indeed, while the received evidence suggests that practically
nothing happens without growth, depending on the extent of initial inequality, growth spells may
either collapse to a grinding halt, get completely reversed, or instead, they could be the trigger for a
virtuous circle from growth-to reduced poverty-to improved equality-to further sustained growth in
the future.  The importance of inequality for this circle can be argued on two grounds.  The basic
argument is that poverty is responsive to both growth and distribution, and that in the presence of
high inequality growth is not likely to be broad-based and therefore, for both economic and political
reasons, it cannot be sustained in the future (e.g. Bruno, Ravallion and Squire, 1998).  Second, more
recently Rodrik (1998a) argues that income and assets inequality, as a cause of “latent” social conflict
in a society, can force the choice of growth retarding polices in response to external shocks.  The
combination of shocks, deep social divisions and weak institutions for conflict management has
been shown by Rodrik to be the main factor behind the collapse of growth across developing
countries in the 1980s
1.
This paper contributes to this debate by analyzing a simple model of poverty, growth and
distribution, which allows poverty and growth to depend on the latter in the short-to-longer run.  In
the short-run the model also accounts for the joint effects on growth of shocks, social conflicts and
the society’s capacity for managing them.  However, in a much longer horizon distribution is
assumed to be endogenous to growth via a Kuznets curve. We take the view that the Kuznets
hypothesis is meant to describe a long transformation process during which not only production
structures change but also institutions change. In short periods of time different economies may find
themselves on either side of the Kuzents curve assuming that it exists. The side on which economies
find themselves will have important implication for the reduction of poverty. This feature of the
model together with the growth equations allows dynamic interactions between growth and
distribution.  This is one of the key areas, recommended for future research, by Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) in their seminal paper on this literature.  Moreover, this feature also permits our model to
have an important policy implication: in that it permits broad classification of countries according to
                                                
1 See also Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994).  However, a rare dissenting view is
presented by Li and Zou (1998), who develop an endogenous growth model--where public consumption is
allowed to enter the utility function---that predicts income inequality to lead to  higher, rather than lower,
growth.2
whether sustained reduction of poverty would require acceleration of growth, redistributive
measures or both.
The model is stated and discussed in section 2.  Section 3 contains an overview of recent theoretical
and empirical advances in the literature on the Kuzents thesis. This section also discuses estimation
results of the Kuznets relationship, and emphasizes its relevance for explaining the reverse
endogeniety of distribution relative to growth as a byproduct of, at least some if not all,
development processes.  Section 4 estimates the basic growth, distribution and poverty
specifications. In section 5 we use the parameter estimates of section 4 to calculate the models
structural parameters.  These were subsequently used to identify policy strategies for poverty
reduction as well as analyze the factors determining the dynamics of poverty and growth.  Section 6
concludes.
2. A Model of Growth, Distribution and Poverty
We posit below a simple model of growth, poverty and distribution.  While focusing on the role of
inequality in the joint determination of the first two variables, the model also accounts for other
non-distributional fundamentals of growth and of the direct effect of growth on poverty. In
addition, we posit a formulation of the Kuznets relationship specifying inequality as an additive
function of mean income and other time varying fixed effects. The steady state solution of the
model allows derivation of the rate of growth consistent with stationary poverty, and the level of
inequality consistent with both stationary poverty and zero rate of acceleration of growth (i.e.
constant long-term rate of growth).   Departure from the steady state, on the other hand, permits
analysis of the phase dynamics of poverty and growth around the steady state.
2.i The basic Model
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where g is the rate of real growth; g* is long term steady state growth; G is a measure of inequality;
F= vector of other growth fundamentals(policy variables, human capital, institutions, initial income
… etc);  1 l ,  1 l  are scalars and  3 l  is a vector of parameters reflecting the effect due the change in
the vector of policy variables  ) ( 0 Policy Policy - ; t is a measure of exogenous shocks; I is an index
of the effectiveness of institutions for resolving social conflicts; P  is an index of poverty; m =mean
income; z= poverty line; e = elasticity of poverty line with respect to mean income; -h = elasticity of
poverty index with respect to m; q is the elasticity of P relative to G,  dx x = & is absolute change over




The above model has two major components: a growth component (equations 1 and 2) and a
poverty component (equations 3 and 4). We discuss these in turn.
The Growth Component
Under the growth component equation (1) specifies long-run target growth as being determined by
the degree of income inequality and a host of other fundamentals--reflecting policy variables,
external factors and initial conditions.  Following Alesina and Rodrik (1994) we assume growth to be
negatively associated with initial degree of inequality (Gini).  At the theoretical level, Alesina and
Rodrik formally establish this negative link by showing that less equal societies are more prone to
distributive polices, which reduces growth by introducing economic distortion. They also empirically
corroborate the prediction of their model using global cross-country data. More recently, Rodrik
(1998a) formally justifies the link between growth and the more general concept of “distributional
conflicts”.  According to Rodrik, such conflicts can “diminish the productivity with which a society’s
resources are utilized in a number of ways: by delaying needed adjustment in fiscal policies and key
relative prices (such as the real exchange rate or real wages), by generating uncertainty in economic
environment, and by diverting activities from the productive sphere to the redistributive one.”
(Rodrik, 1998a: pp.2).
Equation (2) is an error-correction extension of the specification proposed by Rodrik (1998a) in
which growth persistence is disrupted by external shocks in an environment of high social conflicts
(G) and weak institutions (1-I). The variable ( ) 1 ( I G - t ) accounts for the interactions of “latent”
social conflict (in our case taken to be the degree of inequality) with external shocks on one hand,
and with domestic institutions of conflict management on the other.  Rodrik shows this interactions
to be the main factor behind the persistence of growth in East Asia, and its collapse everywhere else
in the developing world, following the external shocks of the late 1970s.  Equation (2) expresses
growth persistence as a weighted function of this effect, an “error correction effect” and the impact
effects of changes in the policy fundamentals of growth.  More formally, this equation can be shown
to be consistent with optimizing behavior, if we assume that the government pursues a moving
growth target by minimizing the following two period error-correction loss function:
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where  )) 1 ( , ( I G Policy h - D = D t is a vector of determinants of the dynamics of growth, which
include changes in the policy fundamentals of growth in addition to the conflict variable.  It is
straightforward to show that equation (2) is a direct result of the above minimization problem
2.
The Poverty Component
Under the poverty component equation (3) is derived from the standard general specification of
poverty index, P, as a function of the standard of living and an inequality measure, such as the Gini
coefficient. Most commonly used poverty measures satisfy the requirement of being homogeneous
of degree zero in the poverty line (z) and mean income (m).  Plausible restrictions on the poverty
index are that (a) its partial with respect to mean income is negative implying that, for a given
inequality, an increase (reduction) in mean income (the poverty line) will be expected to lead to a
                                                
2  See Domowitz and Elbadawi (1987) for an application of this framework in the demand for money literature.4
reduction in poverty, and (b) its partial with respect to the inequality index is positive implying that
an increase in inequality, for a given mean income, will be expected to lead to an increase in poverty
(e.g. Ali,1998)
3.
Total logarithmic differentiation of such generally formulated poverty index gives rise to equation
(3) which decomposes a poverty change into a growth component and a distribution component,
where h is the absolute value of the elasticity of the poverty index with respect to mean income
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Under appropriate assumptions about the behavior of poverty line this equation can be considered
as a complete decomposition of a change in poverty between a growth component and a
distribution component. Until recently, the dominant approach has been to assume that the poverty
line is constant (i.e.  0 =
z
dz
) and to add a residual component R(m/z, G)
4. If the poverty line is
assumed to change, however, the equation could not be taken as a complete decomposition of
poverty changes, without modeling the elasticity of the poverty line with respect to mean income as
well
5.  Recent work has indeed confirmed that a reasonable assumption to make is that the poverty
line is a function of mean income (see, for example, Ali, 1998; Foster, 1998; and Atkinson, 1998).
Under such a procedure, equation (3) posits a complete decomposition of the change in poverty
over time, conditional on the size of the income elasticity of the poverty line (å).  As can be seen
from equation (3), for a constant degree of inequality, growth will only to lead to a reduction in
poverty if the poverty line is inelastic with respect to mean income (i.e. å < 1).
Equation (4) is a general specification of the inequality-development relationship (i.e. the Kuznets
curve).  For empirical purposes Anand and Kanbur (1993 a,b) proposed the following format as
consistent with the original formulation of the hypothesis: 
m
f m f f
1
2 1 0 - - = G . For the purposes
of empirical estimation we add a term that depends on time to capture a time trend.
                                                
3  See also Kakwani (1993) and Datt and Ravallion (1992) and Ali (1996).
4  The functional dependence of the poverty line on mean income is noted by Ravallion, Datt and van de Walle
(1991: 347 & 349) who found, from a survey of local poverty lines from 33 developing countries,  that there is
a clear "tendency for the local poverty line to increase with mean consumption" and that "the cross-country
evidence does suggest that the real poverty lines will tend to increase with growth".
5 For example a semi-logarithmic linear poverty line such as: Logz=a+b1m -b2m2  has an associated elasticity  e = b1m -
2b2m2 , where a and b are coefficients.5
2.ii Steady State Equilibrium and Phase Dynamics
Using equation (4) in equation (3) gives the ultimate reduced form expression for the rate of change
in poverty, which decomposes the change in the poverty index into a “growth effect” net of the
distributional effect through the growth channel (  qn h e a + - - = - ) 1 ( ) and a “trend distributional
effect” (  0 0 qn a = ).
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For given G and gF, steady state levels of g and P (i.e. consistent with  t = = = 0
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P g & ), can be,
respectively, obtained from (1)-(2) and (5):
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The intersection of equations (6) and (7) in the ( G g, ) plane solves for the stationary level of
inequality (G
~
) consistent with constant rate of long-term growth ( 0 = g & ) and stationary rate of
poverty growth ( 0
^
= P ):
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The above expression suggests that a stationary level of poverty (i.e. 
^
P =0) is not necessarily
inconsistent with high steady state level of inequality (G
~
), provided that the absolute rate of
reduction in poverty due to non-distributional growth fundamentals ( F g a  ) is higher than the rate of
change (increase) in poverty due to non-growth factors ( 0 a ) and that the effect of inequality on the
rate of change of poverty through the growth channel ( 0 ab ) is small.  If, on the other hand, the
latter is actually large or that the differences between the two components of the rate of change in
poverty are small, a much smaller steady state level of inequality may be required to prevent poverty
from rising.
Using equations (6), (7) and (8) the dynamic behavior of inequality, poverty and growth around the
steady state can be analyzed with the help of a phase diagram (Figure 2.1).  The diagram suggests six
phases, two of which (I, IV) give rise to a stable path toward the steady state; two phases (III, VI)
are unstable and the remaining two phases (II, V) diverge to unstable phases.  The six phases are
generated by superimposing the curve  G G
~
=  (equation 8) on the phase diagram defined by
equations (6) and (7).  Therefore, strictly speaking, there should be only four phases (I, III, IV,VI),
where what we consider as phase II (phase V) is in fact a divergent region of phase I(phase IV).
However, by adhering to this loose notion in defining the phases we can unambiguously identify the
regions according to whether they are likely to lead to stable or divergent paths.6
Figure 2.1: Phase Diagram of Poverty, Growth and Distribution
Notes:
P= index of Poverty g = rate of per capita GDP growth
G= Gini coefficient g* = level of g consistent with  0 =
·
g
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Third, Phases III ( 0 , 0 ˆ ,
~
> < < g P G G & ) and VI ( 0 , 0 ˆ ,
~
< > > g P G G & ) are both unstable.  In phase
III poverty will continuously decline, since all the combinations are right: growth rises over time and
inequality--already lower than steady level--continuously declines.  Exactly the opposite happens in
phase VI, where poverty rises due to a combination of decelerating growth and worsening
inequality, which is already higher than steady state levels.  Both phases are, however, unstable,
though they could produce a relatively sustained stint of “transitional super-performance”  (e.g.
phase III: East Asia since the 1960s) or a “transitional low equilibrium trap” (e.g. phase VI: Sub-
Saharan Africa since 1970s).
Fourth, Phases II ( 0 , 0 ˆ ,
~
< < < g P G G & ) and V ( 0 , 0 ˆ ,
~
> > > g P G G & ) are divergent, in that they
revert to the unstable path.  In phase II improving distribution dominates the force of decelerating
growth to lead to a continuously declining poverty along an unstable path.  On the other hand, in
phase V worsening inequality dominates accelerating growth leading to continuously rising poverty
over time along the unstable path.
2.iii The Dynamics of Growth and Poverty
If 
^
p  and  g &  are not assumed to be zero, substituting (1), (5), (7) and (8) in (2); and (7) and
(8) in (5) generate the following two dynamic equations:
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Equation (9) suggests that the dynamic path of growth (persistence) is accounted for by four
influences.  First, acceleration of growth is negatively influenced by the external shock effect, with
the extent of inequality and ineffectiveness of institutions determining the magnification effect of
the shock.  This effect is obvious and was sufficiently motivated by Rodrik (1998a).  Second, it is





0 0 = = p g & ) is larger than actual levels of inequality in the initial period ( 0 G ), with the effect
weighted by (the absolute value of) the elasticity of inequality on growth ( 0 b ).  This effect suggests
that when inequality in the initial period was lower than the level consistent with zero rate of growth
acceleration, the latter must be positive in the current period before a new steady state with higher
growth and lower level of poverty is reached.  Third, growth acceleration is also positively affected




).  This effect is consistent with a welfare function that targets a zero or negative
change in poverty, which suggests that for given level of inequality in the initial period, a rise in
poverty in the initial period requires acceleration of growth in the current period to address the
poverty problem. The fourth effect suggests that a change in policy (say improvement in policy)
                                                
6 However, in subsequent applications we drop the last terms, assuming that the component of growth due to non-
distributional fundamentals remains close to its equilibrium values.8
between the two period should lead to acceleration of growth.  The last three channels are all
generated by the error-correction extension to Rodrik’s model.
Finally, equation 10 suggests that when growth rates in the initial period fall short of the rate
consistent with stationary level of poverty, poverty will worsen in the current period.  How far
poverty rises will depend on the extent of the growth shortfall and on the size of the net growth
effect on the rate of change of poverty (a ).  Similarly, poverty worsens in the current period, when
initial inequality exceeds the level consistent with stationary level of poverty.  For a given wedge
between the two levels of initial inequality, the rise in poverty depends on the product ab , where
the latter is the negative of the effect of inequality on long-term growth.  Moreover, the net change
in poverty can be expressed as an outcome of a pure income effect (negative for positive growth
rates) plus a pure (positive) distributional effect.
3. Growth and Inequality in the Development Process: The Kuznets Debate
As is well known the most celebrated proposition relating to the effect of economic growth on
inequality is the Kuznets (1955) hypothesis. Simply put the hypothesis asserts that as development
proceeds (increase in per capita income) inequality will tend to increase at first, reaches a maximum
and then decreases. The hypothesis is based on historical observations pertaining to the sectoral
shifts of population from a low inequality, low productivity sector to a high productivity, high
inequality sector. The hypothesis has been subjected to empirical testing using cross-section data
though most of the researchers were cognizant of the fact that the best approach to such tests would
be that based on time series (see, for example, Ahluwalia, 1976; and Ahluwalia, Carter and Chenery,
1979; but also see Anand and Kanbur, 1993-a and b). The obvious lack of sufficiently long historical
observations prevented this from happening (but see, for example, Minami (1998) for Japan).
In recent years renewed interest in the Kuznets hypothesis has been expressed from a policy
perspective, specially the perspective of the effect of economic policy reforms on the poor (see,
among others, Lal and Myint, 1996; Bruno, Ravallion and Squire, 1998); but see also Horton,
Kanbur and Mazumdar, 1995). In a policy related framework Bruno et al (1998:117) were interested
in answering the question of "do the poor lose, either absolutely or relatively, from policies that
promote aggregate economic growth?". Among their worries is the claim that growth-oriented
reform policies of the kind usually advocated by International Financial Institutions have worsened
the lot of the poor. In the process of responding to these concerns Bruno et al (1998:137) review the
recent evidence and conclude that based on the evidence of the last three decades, there seems to be
no credible support for the Kuznets hypothesis.  The  "stylized fact" that distribution must get
worse in poor countries before it can get better turns out not to be a fact at all. Effects of growth on
inequality can go either way and are contingent on a number of other factors".
Bruno et al (1998: 120) reviewed evidence based on a data set for 63 surveys spanning the period
1981-92 and covering 44 countries where they tried to replicate a number of specifications for
testing the hypothesis typically found in the literature. This was done for both levels and changes
over time, to eliminate the country-level fixed effect. They concluded that in no case was there
evidence of an inverted U, and in no case could one reject the null hypothesis that the regression
coefficients were jointly zero".
While at the empirical policy framework there was an urgency to provide evidence that the Kuznets
hypothesis is not supported, a lot of theoretical political economy models were able to establish the
possibility of the existence of such a relationship between growth and inequality in the long run. The9
results of some models are more robust than others. Thus, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson
(1997) propose a political economy model which features elite in power who could adopt
redistribution policies but who could also democratize society by extending the franchise and
include the masses into the political system. The masses, on their part, possess a revolution
technology where revolution is partly driven by economic motives of poverty and inequality. They
show that when the elite stay in power and redistribute today, there is no guarantee that
redistribution will continue tomorrow. In other words, the promise of continued redistribution by
the elite is non-credible. In contrast, extending the franchise by shifting the median voter changes
future political equilibrium, making democratization a credible commitment to future redistribution.
The dynamic version of the model incorporates human capital and credit market imperfections. It is
assumed that the industrialization process starts with the rich accumulating while the poor unable to
invest in human capital. This leads to increasing inequality. When inequality reaches a critical
maximum the threat of revolution intensifies forcing the elite to extend the franchise. In the new
equilibrium society adopts increased redistribution and schooling and inequality starts to fall. In
countries for which sufficient historical data on inequality exists, it is shown that democratization
happened at the peak of the Kuznets curve. The authors are quick to note that their model does not
predict that the Kuznets curve should be part of the development process of all countries. There are
alternative development paths with no democratization and no Kuznets curve.
Similarly, Bourguignon and Verdier (1997) proposed a political economy growth model to explore
the consequences of allowing political institutions to be endogenous. The endogeniety of political
institutions was accomplished by making political participation dependent on the educational level
of agents in an economy where fixed costs of education and liquidity constraints prevent poor
agents to become educated in the absence of transfers from the upper income and politically active
class. Equilibrium patterns of political institutions, income distribution and growth are characterized
in terms of initial income levels and degree of inequality. In a linear infinite horizon framework
extension of the model it is shown that for intermediate values of income and inequality a Kuznets
curve does exist. Under these intermediate initial conditions, two stages are identified. In the first
stage there is partial investment in skills and there is partial democratization with little redistribution
resulting in increased after tax inequality. In the second stage, all individuals get educated and have
their voice in the political arena with some redistribution being voted resulting in a reduction of after
tax inequality.
A more conventional economic justification for the Kuznets curve based on a dual economy class of
models is provided by Banerjee and Newman (1998). A two sector general equilibrium model is
specified with information asymmetries between the modern sector (high asymmetries and high
productivity) and the traditional sector (low asymmetries and low productivity). In a greatly
simplified dynamic version of the model, where agents learn about their skill level after choosing a
location, it is shown that the economy fully modernizes (but at a slow pace) and “the path of
inequality and income follows an inverted-U curve” (Banerjee and Newman, 1998: 644). The
authors, however, show that if agents learn about their skill level before making a location decision,
the economy could follow an upright-U development path (see, however, Aghion and Bolton, 1997)
for a robust theoretical conclusion based on a model of the economy with capital market
imperfections). The implication of this is that the characteristics of those who choose to migrate
may have important consequences for the evolution of inequality in developing countries.
The above brief review of recent theoretical advances should serve to illustrate the position that the
Kuznets hypothesis is meant to describe a long transformation process during which not only
production structures change but also institutions change. In short periods of time different10
economies may find themselves on either side of the Kuzents curve assuming that it exists. The side
on which economies find themselves will have important implication for the reduction of poverty.
Apart from the theoretical advances sampled above, there is also recent empirical results reported in
the literature supporting the existence of a Kuznets curve (see, for example, Sarel, 1997; and
Hayami, 1998). In what follows, we report our own results based on a sub-sample of the data set of
Chen, Datt and Ravallion (1994). To take account of the length of the run over which the Kuznets
relation is supposed to hold, we augmented the original data set of Chen, Datt and Ravallion by
adding observations on developed countries. We formed a new sample from 33 developing
countries from the original data set: 12 Latin American, 9 Asian and 11 African, in addition to 17
advanced countries (for which income distribution data are available from the World Development
Report 1994; see Appendix Table A.1 and note that the Gini coefficient is our own calculation by
fitting Lorenz curves to the data provided in the WDR).  Instead of the quadratic form, we
estimated Anand and Kanbur (1993) functional form where the Gini coefficient is regressed on
mean income and its reciprocal. This is the functional form used by Ravallion (1995) for changes
over time for a sample of 16 observations. On the basis of his results Ravallion was prepared to
declare that the "rejection of the inverted U hypothesis could hardly be more convincing".
Contrary to this strong finding our cross-country regression results confirm the existence of a
Kuznets curve.  We estimate six versions of the above described Kuznets relation (Table 3.1), based
on two dependent variables (levels and logs of Gini) and three measures of mean income (per capita
private consumption, per capita GDP and per capita GNP).  All six regressions strongly corroborate
the existence of the Anand and Kanbur-type Kuznets curve with a time trend
7.  Given that per
capita private consumption is more closely linked to poverty than the two other measures, and that
the specification with Gini in levels generates more flexible Kuznets elasticities, we select regression
(2) for further analysis.
Given the existence of a Kuznets relationship according to regression 2 (of Table 3.1), the implied
turning point is $1110 per person per year in 1987 PPP.  Not surprisingly, most of the 48 developing
countries covered by the sample were found to be below the turning point except for 14 countries
(see Appendix Table B.1).  This group includes: four countries in Africa (Algeria with mean per
capita consumption of $1243, Gabon ($2621), Mauritius ($1352) and South Africa ($1401)); two
Asian countries (Jordan ($1352) and Malaysia ($1121)); and eight Latin American countries (Brazil
($1254), Chile ($1538), Jamaica ($1126), Mexico ($1230), Panama ($1378), Peru ($2613), Trinidad
($1618) and Venezuela ($1127)).
Assuming that we wish to see the Sub-Saharan African countries to get to the declining inequality
phase by the year 2015, we can use the turning point of ($1110) and the number of years between
the survey year (for the country in question) and 2015, to calculate the required growth of per capita
consumption (see notes to Table 3.2).
With an average population growth rate of 2.8 per cent per annum for the Sub-Saharan Africa
region (excluding the future impact of the AIDS epidemic) most of the above required growth rates
seem to be achievable. The exceptions are Kenya, Zambia, and especially Tanzania, which would
require prohibitively high GDP growth rates to achieve the desired objective.
                                                
7 see also Fishlow (1995), who also corroborates the same specification, with an Africa dummy.11
Similarly, we use the estimated Kuznets equation to calculate the elasticity of the Gini coefficient
with respect to income to explore the overall effect of growth on poverty. Table 3.3 reports the
results of these calculations for the Sub-Saharan Africa sample.
Once again, Tanzania’s elasticity of 0.51 (and to a lesser extent those of Kenya (0.18) and Zambia
(0.22)) are very high relative to other countries in the sample, where the median elasticity is about
0.13.






















































R-squared 0.4437 0.4376 0.4728 0.4560 0.5089 0.4922
F 17.15 16.73 19.28 18.02 22.28 20.84
N 46 46 46 46 46 46
Notes:
Source: Appendix Table B.1.
G – Gini Index(%)
LnG – Natural Logarithm of G
PRC = Per capita Private Consumption in US dollars (1987 PPP)
GDP = Per Capita Gross Domestic Product in US dollars (1987 PPP)
GNP = per capita Gross   National Product (1987 PPP)
YR= Survey year12






Number of years Required growth
rate (%) *
Botswana 1986 472.1 29 3.0%
Cote d'Ivoire 1985 612.1 30 2.0%
Kenya 1992 232.7 23 6.8%
Lesotho 1987 331.0 28 4.3%
Mauritania 1988 363.9 27 4.1%
Senegal 1992 487.8 23 3.6%
Tanzania 1991 125.5 24 9.1%
Zambia 1990 208.3 25 6.7%
Zimbabwe 1990 317.2 25 5.0%
Notes:
1. Sources: Appendix Table B.1 and regression 2 of Table 3.1
2. According to regression 2 of Table 3.1, the turning point before growth and inequality become negatively correlated is at private
consumption per capita of US$ 1110.76.
3. Required growth is computed from the formula
t g PRC
- - =
2015 ) 1 ( 76 . 1110 , where PRC is the level of the per capita consumption for the country in question (PPP 1987), t is the
year of the survey, and g is the annual rate of per capita consumption growth





Estimated Gini Gini Elasticity
w.r.t. Mean
Consumption
Botswana 1986 472.1 54.2 0.080
Cote d'Ivoire 1985 612.1 36.9 0.077
Kenya 1992 232.7 57.9 0.177
Lesotho 1987 331.0 56.0 0.122
Mauritania 1988 363.9 42.5 0.143
Senegal 1992 487.8 54.1 0.076
Tanzania 1991 125.5 38.1 0.513
Zambia 1990 208.3 52.0 0.222
Zimbabwe 1990 317.2 56.8 0.127
Notes:
Source: appendix Table B.1 and regression 2 of Table 3.1
4. An Empirical Analysis of Poverty and Growth
In this section we estimate the key specifications of growth and poverty of section 2, required for
calculating the structural parameters of the model.  First, we estimate long-term growth as well as
persistence of growth (equations 1 and 2 of section 2), using panel data drawn from 62 countries.
Second, we estimate three indexes of poverty and various elasticities of poverty and other related
variables, using country-specific and cross-sectional data.13
4.i The Growth Estimation Results
Long-term Growth:
We estimate an endogenous growth model for a panel of 62 developing countries over six period-
averages: 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-92, 1993-96.   Given the emphasis on the effect
of income distribution on growth, the pivotal variable in the model is the Gini coefficient.
However, our model also controls for other growth fundamentals suggested in the literature. The
results for six growth regressions are shown in Table 4.1.  All the regressions reported are random-
effects models, which according to Hausman specification tests (refer to P values at the bottom of
the Table), were all found to be superior to their fixed-effects counterparts (not reported).  For
primary education, initial income and income squared one period-lags were used.  Therefore, these
variables together with the external shock variable are assumed to be exogenous.  All
macroeconomic fundamentals were instrumented.  However, available data on Gini poses some
problems. There is a group of countries for which data is available for the early 1980s and 1970s, for
this group reverse causation from growth to inequality is not likely, given that the effective
regression sample covers 1986-89, 1990-93, 1994-96.  For the majority of countries, however,
reliable inequality data (see Deininger and Squire, 1996) is available only for the second half of the
1980s or the 1990s.  Moreover, for most countries, only one or very few data points are available for
the entire 1970-1996 period.  To address these problems, we use instrumented one-period lagged
averages of Gini (or just averages for those countries with data available for only one period), where
two-periods lags of other variable in the regression were used as instruments
8.
The results for all six versions of the regression suggest that income inequality is negatively and
robustly associated with growth.  The P-value was 0.03 or less and the parameter estimate was fairly
stable around a median of –0.075.  Regression (1) accounts for basic non-policy growth
fundamentals: initial income inequality, convergence effects, initial primary school enrolment,
external shock and growth in labor force relative to population growth
9.  The measure of external
shock we use is the standard deviation of the first log-difference of the terms of trade multiplied by
the average share of total trade in GDP in the initial period.  This measure captures the unexpected
component of the volatility of the streams of income associated with foreign trade
10. The results of
this regression suggest that beside Gini only the relative labor growth rate is significant.  One
explanation for this, especially with regard to initial income variables, is the fact that our sample is
essentially confined to developing countries.  Regression (2) accounts for investment as well as the
above basic fundamentals.  As expected, investment was positively and significantly associated with
growth (at a P value of 0.02).  However, the inclusion of investment did not change the results for
the original set of variables.  In particular, the effect of Gini remains very significant (at P value of
0.007) and the magnitude of its effects on growth (in absolute terms) only modestly declined (from –
                                                
8  Alesina and Rodrik (1994) also chose instrumentation as one option for addressing reverse causation from
growth to inequality.
9  This variable is given by (growth rate of workers minus overall rate of population growth).  Bloom and Sachs
(1998) recommended adding this variable as an explanatory variable in empirical growth regressions, when, as
usually the case, per capita GDP growth, rather than the theoretically-consistent GDP per worker growth rate
was used as a dependent variable.
10  Assuming that the terms of trade follow a random walk (possibly with a drift) Rodrik (1998b) shows that this
measure is the theoretically appropriate measure of external volatility.  Moreover, Rodrik  argues that the fact
that this measure treats positive terms-of-trade shocks identically as negative shocks is justified, since positive
income shocks could also trigger the same kind of distributional conflicts that obtain under negative shocks.14
0.09 to –0.08).  To the extent that instrumentation of the investment variables has successfully
addressed its potential endogeniety, the effects of investment could be interpreted to account for
overall economic reforms.  However, in the presence of other macroeconomic variables (such as
financial depth, government consumption and openness) investment may be capturing the effects of
other structural reforms such as the privatization of public enterprises, the resolution of debt-overhang
problems, or liberalization of foreign direct investment regimes (Easterly, Loayza and Montiel,
1996).
The joint effects on growth of these variables are accounted for by regression (3).  However, when
simultaneously introduced with the three macroeconomic fundamentals, investment became only
very marginally significant (with a P value of 0.25). Moreover, openness and financial depth were
also only marginally significant (at P values of 0.24 and 0.12, respectively).  However, government
consumption was highly significant (with a P value of 0.01), and was, as expected, negatively
associated with growth.  Again, as in regression (2) the Gini remains significant, even though the
magnitude of its effect (in absolute terms) declined to –0.06.  However, regression (3) (as well as
regressions (1) and (2)) have clearly “over-fitted” the growth process, given the large number of
insignificant variables. Removing insignificant variables from the three regressions gives rise to three
parsimonious regressions (4-6).  The three regressions confirm the stability of the association
between Gini and growth, and the effect of Gini on growth now hovers around -0.07.
We choose regression (6) for further analysis, because, in addition to initial inequality, it accounts for
two pivotal macroeconomic growth variables (investment and government consumption).  These
two variables, could arguably, account for, or at least reflect, all the macroeconomic effects that
matter for growth.
Persistence of Growth:
Using regression (6), we estimate the determinants of growth persistence before and after 1975,
which marked the beginning of major episodes of external shocks that affected most of the
developing world.  The regression was based on the error-correction persistence model of equation
(2). The estimation results are contained in Tables 4.2.  Following Rodrik (1998a), the key variable in
this regression is “Conflict”, which reflect the capacity (or the inability rather) of a society for
managing external shocks. External shocks can be economically costly, when social divisions run
deep (due, for example, to high income-inequality) and the societies institutions for conflicts
management are weak.  Therefore, this variable suggests that the combination of deep social
conflicts and weak social and political institutions tends to magnify the effects of external shocks on
growth, by leading to growth-retarding policies.  We construct six versions of Rodrik-type index of
conflicts (Conflict). The precise definition of “Conflict” is provided in the notes to Table 4.2 and
Appendix Table C.1.  Our results corroborate the earlier findings by Rodrik in that the conflict
variable is negatively and robustly associated with growth persistence.  In all of the six regressions
reported in Table 4.2 (and the 18 regressions of the Appendix Table) the effect of “Conflict” falls
within a range of (-0.0007, -0.0001) and has a P value of 0.06 or less.15
Table 4.1 Growth Regression (Random Effects GLS Regression)
Dependent Variable = Period average Rate of Growth of Real per capita GDP






















































































R-squared 0.1281 0.1837 0.213 0.1016 0.1759 0.1934
Wald test
c2(6)



















236 236 236 236 236 236
Period of estimation: 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-1992, 1993-1996
Notes:
t-values in parenthesis
*- denotes variable has been instrumented
Opn= openness defined as exports plus imports as a ratio of GDP
Gcon = government consumption as a percentage of GDP
Financial Depth = financial depth defined as M2/GDP
Labor = labor force growth net of population growth
Initial income = per capita GDP in previous period (in logarithms)
Schooling = primary school enrolments
TOT Shock = Terms of trade shock given by std deviation of Dln(TOT)70-79 x openness 70-79
The results of Table 4.2 are based on two measures of conflict: Conflict4 (and Conflict41), where
Democracy70 (80) was used in the construction of the first (second), while the same shocks and
inequality values are used in both measures (see notes to the Table).  First, we estimate a basic
model, which accounts only for the conflict’s effect on growth (regressions 1 and 1’).  The estimated
coefficients for Conflict4 and Conflict41 were, respectively, -0.0007 (at P value of 0.007) and -0.0006
(at P value of 0.04).  Regressions 2 and 2' accounts, as well, for error-correction effects, which
suggest that growth in the current period must accelerate, if growth in the previous period was lower16
than the rate consistent with long-term equilibrium growth.  The estimated error-correction effects
were found to be highly significant as well as consistent with theoretical predictions, with estimates
of 0.59 for regression 2 and 0.62 for regression 2', and both have a P value of zero.  The estimated
coefficients of the conflict variables converged to about -0.0006 and both have approximately the
same significance level (P value at .006).  Finally, in regressions 3 and 3' we account, in addition to
these two effects, for the potential role of changes in policy in the dynamics of growth, by adding
the instrumented change in government consumption to the set of explanatory variables.  The latter
variable could be interpreted as an indicator for recent macroeconomic reforms adopted by many
countries, following the external shocks of the second half of the 1970s.  We chose not to assign this
interpretation to changes in investment, because unlike government consumption, it is not a direct
policy instrument.  In both regressions the change in government consumption was found to be, as
expected, negatively and significantly associated with acceleration of growth (P values at about 0.01).
Again the coefficients of the two conflict variables (as well as the error-correction coefficient)
remain highly stable, both in terms of size and significance level.
In section five below we use regressions 6 of Table 4.1 and 3 of Table 4.2, together with other
behavioral distribution and poverty equations, to analyze the sources of the observed growth
collapse as well as the rise in poverty in many developing countries during the post-1975 period
relative to the earlier period (equations 9 and 10).  For the remainder of this section, we briefly
analyze some of the poverty parameters that will be used in the decomposition analysis of the
following section.
Table 4.2: Persistence of Growth Regression (average annual rate of growth in 1975-96
minus average annual rate of growth for 1965-74)





























Adjusted R- Squared 0.1031 0.0539 0.4681 0.4459 0.5548 0.5431
F-test 7.9 4.42 23.32 23.13 22.18 21.20
No. of Observation 61 61 56 56 52 52
Notes:
1. t-values are in parenthesis
2. Macro policy: is defined as change in government consumption as a ratio of GDP in 1975-96 relative to 1965-74
3. Confl4: is defined as std deviation of Dln(TOT)70-79 x openness 70-79 x gini65-74 x democracy70s .
4. Confl41: is defined as conflict4  with the measure of democracy in the 1980s rather than 1970s.
5. Error correction term: is defined as predicted growth in 1965-74 period minus actual growth in the same period.17
4.ii.  Poverty Indexes and Related Elasticities
As noted in the context of formulating the model in section (2) the elasticity of the poverty line with
respect to mean income (or consumption) plays an important role in the decomposition of poverty
changes over time.  The convention of holding the poverty line constant over time, popularized
largely by the work of Ravallion, implies a zero elasticity and as such leads to an overestimation of
the impact of economic growth on poverty reduction and an underestimation of the role played by
distribution in this process.  On the other hand, the assumption of proportionality between the
poverty line and mean income, as used in most European countries, implies a unitary elasticity which
leads to poverty changes exclusively dependent on distributional changes with growth having no
effect.  These extreme cases have serious implications for policy design, especially for low-income
countries such as those of SSA.
Most recent work in the area of poverty analysis has argued for an intermediate formulation that
allows for poverty lines to change with the standard of living (see, for example, Foster, 1998; and
Atkinson, 1998).  In what follows we report poverty results for a sample of countries where the
poverty line is allowed to change with the standard of living (defined as per capita consumption
expenditure: hereafter referred to as mean income (u)).  We estimated the poverty line equation from
information available for 21 African countries and 7 advanced countries.
11
The estimated equation used in generating the poverty results is as follows, where figures in brackets
are t-ratios, z is the poverty line and u is mean income:
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The above equation gives rise to an elasticity of the poverty line which is quadratic in form as
follows:
(12) ) 000003772 . 0 00303 . 0 (
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The elasticity attains a maximum of 0.61 at per capita income level of $403.  The calculated
elasticities at the mean income of the various regions are as follows: 0.411 for Latin America; 0.2701
for Asia and 0.225 for SSA.
Using the above poverty line, poverty results for the countries in our sample are generated by
POVCAL and reported in Appendix Table B.1.  A summary of these results is reported in Table 4.3,
where figures between brackets are standard deviations. Without getting involved in the details,
given the objective of the paper, we note that the above poverty measures are significantly different
                                                
11 We note in passing that the original data set used by Ravallion, Datt and van de Walle (1991) was not used due to a
number of counter intuitive poverty lines.  But this is a debate we do not wish to pursue in this paper, however, we only
note that this set influenced the way poverty analysis was handled for less developed counties over the past eight years or
so giving rise to $1 per day international poverty threshold.
12 Relevant diagnostic LM tests were performed on the residuals with the following results: the test for normality is
given by an LM statistic, equals to 2.7 and distributed as a chi square with 2 degrees of freedom; and the corresponding
LM test for heteroscedasticity equals 1.2 and distributed as chi-square with 1 degree of freedom.18
among regions.  According to the above, Africa is reported to have the highest poverty in terms of
three measures: incidence, depth and severity.  Latin America ranks second highest while Asia is
characterized by relatively low poverty.  This seems to confirm an emerging pattern of stylized facts
about poverty in the world regions.
For the purposes of this paper, however, we are more concerned with the elasticity of the various
poverty measures with respect to mean income (reflecting growth:-h ) and the Gini Coefficient
(reflecting distribution: q ).  These elasticities are reported for the countries of the sample in
Appendix Table B.1.  A summary is reported in Table 4.4.
A general observation on the above results is that poverty is relatively more sensitive to
distributional changes than to growth.  This observation, however, does not apply to the head-count
ratio in Africa, which exhibits more sensitivity to mean income than to the Gini coefficient.  The
second observation is that poverty in Asia exhibits greater sensitivity to its two determinants
compared to Latin America where poverty is relatively more responsive than in Africa.
Table 4.3: Poverty Measures by Region: A Summary (percentages)


























Source:  see Appendix Table B.1.
Standard deviation in parenthesis
Table 4.4: Growth and Distribution Elasticities.  Sample Averages by Region
Region





































Source:  Appendix Table B.1.
Standard deviation in parenthesis19
5. Dynamics of Poverty and Growth and Strategies for Poverty Reduction
We are now ready to put all the pieces together, following the estimation of various behavioral
equations, elasticities and indexes related to growth, distribution and poverty.  Computations related
to the latter are the most extensive.  These include: estimates of elasticities for three indexes of
poverty with respect to mean income and distribution (Gini); the elasticity of the poverty line with
respect to mean income; the elasticity of the Gini with respect to mean income; and the income-
invariant component of the rate of change in the Gini.  Appendix Table B.1 provides a detailed
description of these computations.  Appendix Table D.1 computes the key structural parameters and
indexes of the model, based on the poverty-gap ratio (P1). Further analysis will be confined to this
index of poverty.  The main parameter estimates and indexes reported in the Table include:  0 a , the
component of the rise in poverty attributed to inequality; -a , the poverty reducing effect of growth
net of the partial inequality effect on poverty operating through the growth channel (i.e. the pure
growth effect on poverty); the component of the rate of growth explained by non-distributional
fundamentals ( F g ); the rate of growth consistent with stationary poverty (
o g ); the steady state level
of Gini (G
~
); and the rate of change in poverty (P ˆ ).
Using these estimates together with the parameter estimates for growth (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2) we
illustrate, in this section, some of the key predictions of the theoretical model.  First, we undertake a
decomposition analysis of the factors that led to the collapse of growth in the post-1975 period
across the developing world, except in Asia.  The post 1975 era is characterized with various
episodes of massive external shocks, mostly in terms of negative terms of trade shocks, but  also
spells of positive shocks as well.  Second, we also undertake a similar analysis of the behavior of
poverty before and after 1975.  Third, guided by the phase dynamics framework of section 2, and
based on country performance in 1990s in terms of the growth acceleration, changes in poverty and
extent of inequality, we classify the countries in the sample according to the six phases suggested by
Figure 2.1 of the model.  This allows identification of broad strategies for dealing with poverty,
depending on the phase in which the country is predicted to be located
13.
5.i The Collapse of Growth in the Post 1975 Era
Persistence of growth (average annual rate of growth in 1975-96 minus the rate for 1965-74) is
explained by four potential determinants (equation 9 of section 2).  These factors are the capacity of
a society to manage the impact of exogenous shocks (both negative or positive: see footnote 9),
represented by the variable “Conflict”; the change in macroeconomic policy, perhaps due to
economic reforms in response to shocks; the extent to which society is equal relative to the level
consistent with steady state equilibrium (stationary poverty and zero acceleration/deceleration of
growth); and the extent of poverty in the initial period.  The results by regional median are shown in
Figure 5.1.  Appendix Table D.2 contains detailed country by country results. Notwithstanding
possible country-specific anomalies, the main regional story, however, bodes quite well with other
stylized facts on cross-regional performances.
First, between the two periods median average rates of growth decelerated by –2.5% in Africa
(continental Africa) and by –1.7% in Latin America & the Caribbean (LAC), while growth
accelerated by 0.4% in Asia. These observed rates of changes were, by and large, explained by the
                                                
13 The computed parameters as well as the country classifications of Table 5.1 appear to be fairly robust for different
specifications of the Kuznets relation and the poverty indexes.20
four channels identified above, where the diversion between the actual and predicted change in the
rate of growth does not exceed 40% for any of the three regions.
Second, the role of capacity for managing conflicts following external shocks, was one of the main
factors behind this outcome in Africa and to a lesser extent in LAC and Asia.  The failures of Africa
and LAC on this area contributes –1.1 and –0.5%, respectively, to the collapse of growth in the two
regions; while it would have decelerated growth by –0.1% in Asia, if others factors remain at their
1965-74 levels.
Third, the nature of income distribution in the previous period plays the most dominant role in
setting Asia apart from the other two regions.  This factor could be interpreted as the “absolute
conflict” effect.  A more equitable initial income distribution (relative to levels consistent with steady
state) in Asia has had a partial contribution of 0.8% per annum to subsequent growth acceleration in
the post 1975 period; while the less equitable income distributions in Africa and LAC (relative to
their respective thresholds) have, respectively, accounted for –1.4 and –1.9% of the deceleration of
growth in the two regions during the post 1975 era.
Notes:
Source: Appendix Table D.2
gdot          =  average annual rate of growth in 1975-96 minus average
    annual rate of growth in 1965-74
Conflict     ” component of change due to conflict (confl4 is used: see        
    notes to table 4.2)
Inequality  ” component of change due to initial inequality (lagged Gini)
Ini.poverty ” component of change due to behavior of poverty in the       
    initial period (rate of change of poverty in 1965-74)
Policy        ”  annual average rate of change in government consumption  between the two periods
Figure 5.1: Determinants of Growth Dynamics in Africa and Other Regions in the 1975-96 
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Fourth, rising poverty in the previous period appear to matter, as a trigger factor, for generating
concerns about the need to accelerate growth in the current period.  The motivation for policy
makers, for example, to be concerned about growth when poverty was high or rising could be
justified by ultraistic political motives on the part of the ruling elites.  This effect would have led to
acceleration of growth by 1.4% in Africa, if other factors remain at their initial levels.  However, the
effects of this factor were small for the other two regions: about 0.3% for LAC and a negligible
0.01% for Asia.  The results for Asia appear consistent with the sustained growth acceleration and
relatively better performance of poverty over time.
Finally, the direct effect of change in policy was generally of a lesser order of magnitude compared
to the others.  However, while it only accounted for a miniscule part of growth in Asia (-0.09%) and
to some extent LAC (-0.3%), worsening policy environment have had caused a higher growth
reducing effect in Africa (at –0.7%).
5.ii  The Behavior of Poverty Since 1975
The behavior of poverty over time (rate of change in poverty between 1965-74 and 1975-96) is
explained by the net effects on poverty of growth and distribution (equation 10 of section 2).  The
results by regional median are shown in Figure 5.2.  Appendix Table D.3 contains detailed country
by country results.  Like the case of growth, and not withstanding some possible country-specific
anomalies, the main regional story bodes quite well with other stylized facts on cross-regional
performances.
Notes:
     Source: Appendix Table D.3
    Growth: component of change in poverty due to growth
    alpha0:  Component of change due to distribution
    phat:      net change in poverty
Figure 5.2: Dynamics of Poverty in Africa and Other Regions: (Predicted annual average 
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First, between the two periods median poverty rose by about 1.3% for Africa and 1.9% for LAC,
while it declined by –2.3% for Asia.
Second, the income-invariant distributional effect would have led to a rise in poverty in all regions:
by 1.4% for Africa, 2.3% for LAC and 3.3% for Asia.  However, unlike the former two regions the
“pure” growth effect in Asia substantially dominate the distributional effect.  While for unchanged
distribution, sustained growth acceleration would have reduced poverty in Asia by about –5.6%,
growth was rather inconsequential in the other two regions (it would have reduced poverty by –0.1
for Africa and –0.5% for LAC).  Therefore, it is not surprizing that Asia experienced an overall
decline in poverty, while the reverse happened in Africa and LAC.
Third, the results for Asia appears to support the Kuznets thesis, where growth was associated with
rising inequality, even though the former was sufficiently deep to lead to overall poverty reduction
despite worsening income distribution.  On the other hand, the results of the other two regions
describe cases of both decelerating growth and worsening income distribution, with the latter
determining the net effect on poverty.
5.iii Strategies for Dealing with Poverty
In section 2 we discuss the dynamic behavior of inequality, poverty and growth around the steady
state, where six phases were identified, two of which give rise to stable paths toward the steady state
(Figure 2.1).  Based on average growth, poverty and distribution performance (Appendix Table D.4),
Table 5.1 provides classifications of countries according to the phase they are likely to be associated
with during the 1975-96 period.  We discuss very briefly this classification and the implied strategy
for poverty reduction.
First, eight countries (seven from Africa and LAC, in addition to The Philippine from Asia) are
characterized by rising poverty, decelerating growth and higher inequality than levels consistent with
the steady state.  According to our model these countries are located in Phase VI, and in all
likelihood they are in a “transitional low equilibrium trap”, driven by an unstable path of rising
poverty. For these countries both low growth and bad distribution are constraints on sustainable
poverty reduction.  However, redistributive measures are particularly important to move the
economies of these countries to Phase IV (to the left of the  G G
~
=  schedule: Figure 2.1), where the
rise in poverty will come to a halt at the steady state along a stable path.  Moreover, a combination
of growth acceleration and efficient distributional measures could push these countries further to
Phase III, where poverty declines continuously along a transitional unstable path of “super-
performance”.
Second, Phase V contains a group of 22 countries (all from Africa and LAC), which have similar
characteristics to the above countries, except that they were able to accelerate growth on average.
Nevertheless, these countries will eventually diverge to Phase VI and therefore, they are likely to be
located in the region characterized by “transitional low equilibrium trap”. Even though growth may
be less of a constraint for these countries, they would however, need the same redistribute measures
recommended for the countries of Phase VI.
Third, three African countries (Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania) are characterized by rising poverty,
accelerating growth and equitable distribution relative to steady state levels.  These countries are
located in Phase IV, where poverty rises, though at a decreasing rate, until it becomes stationary at
the steady state along a stable path.  However, this is not a desired equilibrium, given initial levels of
poverty in these countries.  As in the first two groups of countries, a combination of growth23
acceleration and efficient distributional measures could push these countries to Phase III, where they
can enjoy spells of poverty reduction.
Fourth, a group of seven countries---including four Asian countries (Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, Malaysia), in addition to Chile from LAC and the two African countries of Mauritius
and Uganda---are judged to be located in Phase III, which produces an unstable path of
continuously declining poverty.  This is probably the phase consistent with the good side of the
Kuznets curve, where only growth matters for simultaneously reducing poverty as well as improving
distribution over time.  This would happen if this phase also produces a relatively sustained era of
“transitional super-performance”.  However, and as the recent Asian crisis attests, it appears that the
real challenge for keeping this potentially unstable phase as long as possible is avoiding a sudden
collapses of growth.
Fifth, four countries (China, Indonesia, Egypt, India: located in Phase II) have similar characteristics
to the countries of Phase III, except that they were unable to accelerate growth as did the others.
Nevertheless, these countries will eventually diverge to Phase III and therefore, they are likely to
enjoy a relatively long period of prosperity, provided that they manage to sustain moderately positive
growth.
Sixth, three more countries (Tunisia, Botswana, Jordan) are predicted to be located in Phase I, where
growth was decelerating, inequality was higher than steady state levels, yet poverty was declining.
The latter could be accounted for by high and efficient, though decelerating, growth rates.
However, for this group, poverty is predicted to declines at a decreasing rate along a stable path and,
will therefore, come to a halt at the steady state.  For this group, both distribution and growth are
important.  For example, a collapse of growth (negative rates of real growth) might push these
countries into a transitional “low equilibrium trap”, where poverty rises over time (as believed to be
the case of Jordan since the late 1980s).  On the other hand, more equitable distribution and positive
growth could move these countries into a “transitional super-performance” phase, and hence
produce a more sustained era of declining poverty.
Finally, it is important to point out that the above analysis depends on the estimated (or assumed)
initial performance of countries in terms of growth acceleration, poverty and distribution.  The
simulated strategies for dealing with poverty are, therefore, contingent on the choice of the initial
period.  However, and despite that the predictions could have over-stated the performance of a few
countries, overall, the analysis appears to be strongly corroborated by the recent development
experiences of the majority of the countries.24
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1.Poverty would decline at a decreasing
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2.Avoiding growth collapse and achieving
more equitable distribution would prolong
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Phase III)
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Accelerating growth, and especially
avoiding growth collapse (East Asia recent
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Rwanda, Nigeria,
Tanzania.
1.Poverty would rise at a decreasing rate
along a stable path toward the steady state.
2.Growth is the key constraint, where
higher growth could shift the economy to
Phase III.
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1.Divergent phase of continuously rising
poverty: “transitional low equilibrium
trap”
2.growth is not an immediate constraint,
but redistributive measures will be
required to shift the economy to Phase IV,
and possibly Phase III
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1.Unstable path towards continuously
rising poverty:  “transitional low
equilibrium trap”
2. Both growth and distribution are
constrains but redistributive measures will
be required to shift the economy to phase
IV , and possibly Phase III
Source: Appendix Table D.425
6. Conclusions
This paper is concerned with modeling the dynamic interactions between growth and distribution in
the analysis of the behavior of poverty over time, and the determination of the level of income
inequality consistent with steady state stationary level of poverty and constant long term rate of
growth. To address these issues, we specify a simple model of growth, poverty and distribution.  In
addition to accounting for the role of inequality in the joint determination of the first two variables,
the model also controls for other non-distributional fundamentals of growth and of the direct effect
of growth on poverty. In addition, in the very long run the model assumes distribution to be
endogenous to growth via a Kuznets curve. We take the view that the Kuznets hypothesis is meant
to describe a long-term transformation process during which not only production structures change
but also institutions change. In short periods of time different economies may find themselves on
either side of the Kuzents curve assuming that it exists. The side on which economies find
themselves will have important implication for the reduction of poverty.  This feature of the model,
together with the growth equations, allow dynamic interactions between growth and distribution.
As inputs to the calculation of the models’ structural parameters, we estimate a long-run cross-
country model for the Gini, which strongly supports the Kuznets’ thesis of a non-monotonic
relationship between growth and inequality.  The two variables are positively related at income levels
less than a certain threshold (estimated at $1110 per person per year in 1987 PPP), while they are
negatively related for income levels higher than this threshold.  We also estimate long-term growth
as well as persistence of growth.  The long-run endogenous growth model was estimated using panel
data drawn from 62 countries over six periods: 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-93, 1994-
96.  Our results suggest that, controlling for other fundamentals, initial inequality is negatively and
robustly associated with growth.  The estimation of the persistence of growth (measured as the
difference between average growth rate in 1975-1996 and 1965-74) corroborates the theoretical
model in that: the key “Conflict” variable was found to be robustly and negatively associated with
persistence of growth, even after controlling for other important determinants.  This channel
accounts for the interaction between external shocks, social conflicts (in our case high income-
inequality) and the capacity of institutions for managing conflicts. The other variables, found to be
robustly associated with growth, are an error-correction effect and the influence due to change in
policy.  The former effect suggests that if growth in the previous period was lower than the rate
consistent with the fundamentals, growth will accelerate in the second period.  Finally, we estimate a
poverty line, which is subsequently used to compute three poverty indexes (Head Count Ratio (H),
Poverty Gap ratio (P1) and Squared Poverty Gap Ratio (P2)).  The poverty line, the longer term
behavioral specification for the Gini, in addition to the three poverty indexes allow derivation of the
key elasticities required for the calculation of the model’s structural parameters.  The results confirm
the widely held view that Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest poverty in terms of the three measure:
incidence, depth and severity.  In addition, the estimated elasticities suggest that with the exception
of the Head Count Index for Sub-Saharan Africa, poverty is relatively more sensitive to distribution
than to growth; and that poverty in Asia tend to be more responsive to these two determinants than
in other regions.
Using the growth and poverty estimates (the latter are based on the Poverty Gap index: P1) we
illustrate some of the key predictions of the theoretical model.  First, we undertake a decomposition
analysis of the factors that led to the collapse of growth in the post-1975 period across the
developing world, except in East Asia.  The post 1975 era is characterized by various episodes of
massive external shocks, mostly in terms of negative terms of trade shocks, but also spells of26
positive shocks as well.  Our results suggest that the initial level of inequality was the major factor
behind the collapse of growth in (Continental)  Africa and LAC in the post 1975 period, and its
acceleration in Asia during the same period.  Initial inequality affect growth persistence through two
channels.  First, because it’s among the determinants of long-term growth, it affects growth
persistence through the error-correction effect.  Second, by being a cause of social conflicts, it
affects growth persistence through its magnification effects of the impact of external shocks.  Our
results also show that while rising poverty in the initial period provides an important motivation for
accelerating growth in the current period, the direct effects of policy changes are relatively small.
Second, we also undertake a similar analysis of the behavior of poverty during 1975-96. Our results
suggest that the marginal effect of increased inequality between the two periods has led to rising
poverty in all three regions.  However, unlike Africa and LAC, sufficiently deep and sustained
growth in Asia more than compensated for poverty-worsening distributional effects, thus leading to
an overall decline of poverty at a rate of –2.36% per annum.  On the other hand, due to low or
negative growth rates in Africa and LAC, poverty rose in both regions: by 1.3% for Africa and 1.9%
for LAC.
Finally, guided by the phase dynamics framework suggested by the paper’s model, we use indicators
of country performance during 1975-96-- in terms of the rate of acceleration of growth, changes in
poverty and extent of inequality—to classify the countries in the sample according to the six phases
suggested by the model. This allows identification of broad strategies for dealing with poverty,
depending on the phase in which the country is predicted to be located. The main policy
recommendation of this analysis is that, for the majority of countries—36 out of 47—any serious
strategy for poverty reduction must include both policies for accelerating growth as well as measures
for effecting more equitable income distribution. Moreover, the latter must be sufficiently deep
either to shake-off the “transitional”, though lingering, “low equilibrium trap” that characterizes
some economies; or to more others from the “bad” equilibrium of stationary, but high, poverty.
Despite the illustrative nature of our analysis and that it is contingent on the selection of the initial
period, we believe however, that it does suggest sensible policy implications, which are also
corroborated by recent development experiences of the majority of the countries.27
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Appendix Table (A.1): Mean Expenditure and Gini Coefficients for a Sample of Countries



















Bolivia (90)    1034.3    42.04 Bangladesh
(89)
    630.2     26.92 Spain (88)    4576.9      28.16
Brazil (85)    1474.8    59.54 India (83)     322.0     32.2 Australia (85)    7939.3      37.83
Chile (89)    1590.4    57.88 Nepal (85)     474.2     30.06 UK (88)    7752.4     39.83
Colombia
(88)
   2462.6    53.11 Pakistan  (91)     797.0     31.15 Italy (86)    7220.7     34.03
Costa Rica
(89)
   1168.4   46.07 Sri Lanka
(90)
    585.5     32.47 Netherlands
(88)
   6880.8     28.78
Dominican
(89)
   1148.3    50.46 Botswana
(86)
    929.2     54.21 Canada (87)    9275.0     34.59
Guatemala
(87)
     527.9    58.26 Cote d’Ivoire
(85)
    839.5     44.63 Belgium (79)    7034.9     28.08
Honduras
(89)
     539.4    59.49 Ethiopia (82)     568.2      35.90 Finland (81)    6241.8      31.91
Jamaica (90)    1540.4    43.16 Ghana (88)     875.5      36.74 France (89)    7179.9      36.05
Mexico (84)    1158.6    50.71 Kenya (92)     703.3      57.46 Germany
(88)
   6806.2      33.29
Panama (89)    1313.9    56.57 Lesotho (87)     722.4      56.02 USA (85)  12195.4      37.35
Peru (86)      937.7    45.72 Mauritania
(88)
    663.0      42.53 Norway (79)    7338.2      30.92
Venezuela
(89)
  1003.7    44.08 Senegal  (92)     550.0      54.12 Denmark
(81)
   7241.3      33.62
China (85)     888.2    32.96 Tanzania (91)     873.6     59.01 Sweden (81)    6690.4      29.19
Indonesia
(84)
    537.0    34.15 Zambia (91)     242.8     43.51 Japan (79)    6898.1      28.70
Philippines
(88)
   792.6    40.68 Zimbabwe
(90)
    939.6      56.83 Switzerland
(82)
 10096.9      38.99
Thailand (88)  1210.4    43.81 New Zealand
(82)
  6165.0     39.50 Average   3151.6      41.67
Source: Chen, Datt and Ravallion (1993) and World Bank (1994).31
Appendix Table B.1: Poverty Line, Inequality and Poverty Measures and associated Elasticities
Country Year m m PRC Z G H P1 P2 -h hH -h hP1 -h hP2 q qH q qP1 q qP2 e e V v0
1  Algeria 88 118.00 1243.76 50.40 39.281 16.870 4.210 1.710 -2.670 -3.000 -2.930 3.570 6.350 8.590 0.305 -0.013 0.0007
2  Botswana* 86 53.67 472.10 33.81 54.209 54.460 25.630 15.020 -0.750 -1.120 -1.410 0.440 2.250 4.000 0.152 0.080 0.0005
3  Cote d’Ivoire 88 65.00 612.08 36.38 36.893 30.100 8.860 3.520 -1.740 -2.400 -3.030 1.370 3.670 5.960 0.181 0.077 0.0007
4  Egypt 91 88.77 659.49 42.27 32.006 13.880 2.080 0.420 -3.540 -5.670 -7.840 3.900 8.340 12.820 0.239 0.076 0.0008
5  Gabon 77 133.04 2621.09 55.16 62.872 46.220 21.640 12.710 -0.800 -1.140 -1.400 1.130 4.020 6.810 0.336 -0.069 0.0004
6  Guinea 95 28.42 299.73 28.61 46.870 63.680 34.430 23.360 -0.650 -0.850 -0.950 0.000 0.999 1.980 0.083 0.164 0.0006
7  Guinea Bissau 91 37.27 143.24 30.35 56.168 61.860 34.810 24.430 -0.620 -0.780 -0.850 0.140 1.410 2.650 0.108 0.304 0.0005
8  Kenya 92 49.95 232.65 33.00 57.891 59.400 28.420 17.020 -0.740 -1.090 -1.340 0.380 2.070 3.710 0.142 0.177 0.0005
9  Lesotho 87 80.79 331.00 40.21 56.011 45.770 21.790 13.160 -0.820 -1.100 -1.310 0.830 3.120 5.340 0.220 0.122 0.0005
10  Madagascar 93 31.72 183.84 29.25 43.459 65.480 27.970 15.100 -0.820 -1.340 -1.700 0.070 1.200 2.310 0.092 0.303 0.0006
11  Mauritania 88 51.00 363.90 33.23 42.535 38.720 18.190 13.330 -1.260 -1.130 -0.730 0.670 2.140 3.460 0.145 0.143 0.0006
12  Mauritius 91 278.79 1352.70 117.50 36.555 16.010 4.240 1.750 -2.390 -2.770 -2.840 3.280 6.180 8.640 0.552 -0.024 0.0007
13  Morocco 91 110.77 691.00 48.35 39.200 21.340 4.970 1.540 -2.130 -3.290 -4.440 2.750 6.540 10.320 0.289 0.056 0.0007
14  Niger 92 32.40 211.88 29.38 36.243 61.060 21.590 10.150 -1.130 -1.830 -2.250 0.120 1.290 2.440 0.094 0.312 0.0007
15  Nigeria 93 62.85 139.57 35.88 44.893 40.030 17.530 10.010 -1.010 -1.280 -1.500 0.760 2.720 4.630 0.176 0.391 0.0006
16  Rwanda 83 36.34 329.57 30.17 29.066 50.030 13.120 4.570 -1.670 -2.810 -3.740 0.340 1.780 3.170 0.105 0.237 0.0009
17  Senegal 91 63.04 487.82 35.93 54.117 49.660 22.670 13.080 -0.840 -1.190 -1.470 0.630 2.650 4.610 0.176 0.076 0.0005
18  South Africa 93 229.20 1401.39 92.75 61.060 45.610 23.500 14.970 -0.680 -0.940 -1.140 1.000 3.860 6.620 0.496 -0.017 0.0004
19  Tanzania 93 26.00 125.54 28.15 38.102 70.950 30.500 16.340 -0.740 -1.330 -1.730 0.060 0.820 1.710 0.076 0.513 0.0007
20  Tunisia 90 184.24 784.44 73.47 40.001 19.140 5.320 1.990 -1.860 -2.600 -3.340 2.810 6.430 10.050 0.430 0.040 0.0007
21  Uganda 93 30.18 445.99 28.95 40.740 67.420 27.640 14.120 -0.800 -1.440 -1.910 0.030 1.100 2.170 0.088 0.115 0.0007
22  Zambia 76 52.13 208.27 33.48 51.998 52.420 24.240 14.190 -0.830 -1.160 -1.430 0.460 2.200 3.900 0.148 0.222 0.0005
23  Zimbabwe 90 58.52 317.20 34.89 56.834 57.560 26.070 14.270 -0.670 -1.210 -1.650 0.460 2.450 4.480 0.164 0.127 0.0005
 Africa Average 82.70 593.84 43.55 45.96 45.55 19.54 11.16 -1.27 -1.80 -2.21 1.10 3.20 5.23 0.21 0.148 0.0006
 s         s        66.96 581.34 22.45 9.84 18.03 10.18 6.90 0.78 1.14 1.57 1.24 2.15 3.05 0.13 0.144 0.0001
1  Bangladesh 86 45.45 143.00 32.04 38.976 41.670 12.860 5.900 -2.050 -2.240 -2.360 0.860 2.360 3.830 0.130 0.439 0.0007
2  China 92 132.06 169.90 54.85 37.256 18.750 7.260 3.910 -1.470 -1.580 -1.720 2.080 4.630 7.230 0.334 0.384 0.0007
3  India 92 44.21 238.59 31.78 32.044 40.840 10.370 3.650 -1.930 -2.940 -3.680 0.760 2.540 4.220 0.127 0.310 0.0008
4  Indonesia 93 107.72 361.12 47.47 31.688 10.680 1.190 0.180 -4.590 -8.010 -11.450 5.820 12.440 19.070 0.283 0.194 0.0008
5  Jordan 91 139.09 1352.86 57.13 40.656 19.190 4.260 1.270 -2.280 -3.510 -4.730 3.260 7.460 11.650 0.348 -0.022 0.0007
6  Malaysia 89 182.51 1121.98 72.79 48.351 28.430 9.370 4.060 -1.420 -2.030 -2.610 2.140 5.570 8.950 0.427 -0.001 0.0006
7  Pakistan 91 80.29 238.94 40.09 31.143 15.130 3.420 1.300 -3.120 -3.420 -3.250 3.120 5.430 7.260 0.219 0.319 0.0009
8  Philippines  88 104.00 418.95 46.41 46.665 29.310 9.230 4.080 -1.640 -2.180 -2.520 2.040 4.940 7.610 0.274 0.109 0.0006
9  Sri Lanka 90 85.10 321.75 41.31 30.098 12.940 2.180 0.510 -3.300 -4.930 -6.630 3.500 7.290 11.140 0.231 0.235 0.0009
 Asia Average 102.27 485.23 47.10 37.43 24.10 6.68 2.76 -2.42 -3.43 -4.33 2.62 5.85 9.00 0.26 0.219 0.0007
       s         s  44.85 439.15 13.06 6.83 11.58 4.07 1.98 1.05 1.99 3.05 1.54 3.04 4.62 0.10 0.163 0.0001
1  Bolivia 90 71.57 559.90 37.94 42.038 34.460 11.500 5.040 -1.380 -1.200 -2.560 1.220 3.660 6.040 0.198 0.079 0.0006
2  Brazil 89 282.15 1254.23 119.31 60.662 48.050 23.420 13.930 -0.670 -1.050 -1.360 0.920 3.800 6.590 0.555 -0.009 0.0004
3  Chile   94 226.66 1538.71 91.57 56.493 38.100 14.950 7.530 -1.070 -1.550 -1.970 1.570 4.760 7.860 0.493 -0.026 0.0005
4  Columbia 91 226.43 786.69 91.47 50.293 28.340 11.810 6.680 -1.250 -1.400 -1.540 1.840 4.540 7.220 0.493 0.031 0.0005
5  Costa Rica 89 191.14 1020.60 76.23 46.116 25.690 10.420 5.700 -1.270 -1.470 -1.660 1.910 4.720 7.510 0.441 0.008 0.0006
6  Dom. Rep. 89 124.93 651.40 52.60 50.789 32.800 11.900 5.730 -1.270 -1.760 -2.160 1.740 4.790 7.720 0.320 0.049 0.0005
7  El Salvador 77 91.97 1073.20 43.11 47.462 39.720 13.440 5.650 -1.060 -1.950 -2.760 1.210 4.350 7.400 0.247 0.003 0.0006
8  Guatemala 89 155.93 719.53 62.88 59.899 40.840 20.510 13.220 -0.830 -0.990 -1.100 1.230 3.950 6.590 0.381 0.033 0.0004
9  Honduras 92 77.12 640.73 39.30 51.752 41.050 16.940 9.410 -1.120 -1.420 -1.600 1.070 3.330 5.470 0.211 0.050 0.0005
10  Jamaica 93 120.71 1126.84 51.31 37.916 17.630 4.020 1.240 -2.300 -3.390 -4.480 3.120 6.930 10.760 0.311 -0.002 0.0007
11  Mexico 89 300.86 1230.72 129.66 55.278 38.200 16.450 9.340 -1.030 -1.320 -1.520 1.360 4.070 6.650 0.570 -0.008 0.0005
12  Nicaragua 93 59.83 692.82 35.19 50.072 47.020 19.820 10.720 -0.970 -1.370 -1.700 0.680 2.660 4.590 0.168 0.044 0.0005
13  Panama 89 140.35 1378.10 57.54 56.822 38.190 19.870 13.410 -0.840 -0.920 -0.960 1.210 3.770 6.260 0.351 -0.017 0.0005
14  Peru 94 155.22 2613.93 62.63 45.106 24.860 8.210 3.750 -1.550 -2.030 -2.380 2.300 5.480 8.470 0.379 -0.096 0.0006
15  Trinidad** 81 233.12 1618.46 94.57 41.565 24.350 11.740 7.650 -1.080 -1.070 -1.070 1.580 4.040 6.500 0.501 -0.042 0.0006
16  Venezuela 90 304.78 1127.06 131.88 53.836 38.050 15.390 8.020 -1.050 -1.470 -1.840 1.380 4.240 7.030 0.573 0.007 0.0005
 L. America Average 172.67 743.22 73.58 50.38 34.83 14.40 7.94 -1.17 -1.52 -1.92 1.52 4.32 7.04 0.39 0.007 0.0005
       s         s  82.01 515.16 32.66 6.69 8.57 5.04 3.59 0.37 0.59 0.86 0.59 0.96 1.37 0.14 0.042 0.0001
 Overall Average 109.05 751.21 52.003 45.833 37.958 15.416 8.513 -1.452 -2.014 -2.511 1.523 4.070 6.541 0.263 0.114 0.0006
       s         s  78.64 591.16 27.75 9.39 16.33 9.10 6.08 0.86 1.37 1.94 1.25 2.24 3.26 0.15 0.146 0.0001
Notes:
m = mean income -hP1=elasticity of poverty index (P1) relative to mean income
PRC = per capita private consumption -hP2= elasticity of poverty index (P2) relative to mean income
Z = poverty line, based on below equation qH= elasticity of poverty index (H) relative to income distribution
G = measure of inequality  qP1= elasticity of poverty index (P1) relative to Income distribution
H = an index of poverty (head count ratio)  qP2= elasticity of poverty index (P2) relative to income distribution
P1: an index of poverty e = elasticity of poverty line with respect to mean income (based on the below equation)
P2: an index of poverty v = Elasticity of Gini Index to per capita private consumption  (based on regression 2 of Table 3.1)
-hH = elasticity of poverty index (H) relative to mean income v0 = component of the rate of change in Gini that doe not depend on income (or consumption) level (based on regression 2 of Table 3.1)
Poverty Line Estimation Equation:
LogZi = 1.3719 + 0.00303mi - 0.000001886(mi*mi)   ;R square = 0.97,  adj. R Square = 0.96;   and  e = [0.00303m  - 0.000003772(m * m)]
               (56.76 )    (10.96 )              (-5.25 )32
Appendix Table C.1 : Persistence of Growth Regression (rate of Growth in 1975-96 minus rate of growth for
1965-74)







































































































































Confl1: standard deviation of Dln(TOT)70-79 x openness70-79  x gini65-74 x democracy70s .
Confl11: is defined as confl1 with the  measure of democracy in the 1980s rather than in 1970s.
Confl2: is defined as std deviation of Dln(TOT)70-74 x openness70-74 x gini65-74 x democracy70s .
Confl21: is defined as confl2  with the measure of democracy in the 1980s rather than in 1970s.
Confl3: is defined as std deviation of Dln(TOT)70-89 x openness70-79 x gini65-74 x democracy70s .
Confl31: is defined as confl3 with the measure of democracy in the 1980s rather than in 1970s.
Error Correction term = predicted annual rate of growth (1965-74) – actual average annual rate of growth    (1965-
74)
Macro Policy = is defined as the “instrumented” change in government consumption as a ratio of GDP in 1975-96
relative to 1965-7433
Appendix Table D.1: Structural Parameters and Variables
Country a0 a b0 g g0 gF0 G 0
~
G G0 g &
0 ˆ P P ˆ Confl4 •
gcon
Algeria 4.344 2.167 0.071 0.045 2.571 2.7479 39.281 22.486 38.00 -2.5260 -1.226 4.248 2672 0.079
Botswana* 1.115 0.771 0.071 5.293 11.708 9.1350 54.209 28.040 54.00 -6.4151 -7.911 -2.965 1026 na
Cote d’Ivoire 2.673 1.684 0.071 -1.200 4.162 1.7312 36.893 28.040 41.21 -5.3623 -4.336 4.695 3633 0.020
Egypt 7.003 3.677 0.071 3.673 1.305 6.3768 32.006 28.040 38.00 2.3687 2.205 -6.506 1478 -0.072
Gabon 1.718 1.034 0.071 -0.774 8.496 3.7205 62.872 22.486 63.18 -9.2698 -7.063 2.519 4850 0.041
Guinea 0.573 0.615 0.071 1.299 na 4.1479 46.870 37.433 40.04 na na -0.227 na na
Guinea Bissau 0.675 0.267 0.071 0.730 0.591 4.7226 56.168 37.433 56.12 0.1394 0.517 0.479 na 0.007
Kenya 0.961 0.570 0.071 0.480 4.454 4.3493 57.891 37.433 54.39 -3.9741 -1.577 0.687 4459 0.043
Lesotho 1.497 0.476 0.071 2.983 5.852 6.9680 56.011 28.040 56.02 -2.8693 -1.291 0.076 4528 0.086
Madagascar 0.742 0.853 0.071 -2.198 1.101 0.8922 43.459 37.433 43.44 -3.2995 -0.197 2.617 413 0.007
Mauritania 1.352 0.660 0.071 -0.320 -0.996 2.7060 42.535 28.040 42.53 0.6764 2.009 1.563 1796 0.045
Mauritius 4.543 1.392 0.071 4.310 2.155 7.3456 36.555 22.486 42.67 2.1545 1.542 -1.458 274 0.009
Morocco 4.484 1.970 0.071 2.089 3.681 4.8775 39.200 28.040 39.19 -1.5918 -2.768 0.367 411 0.064
Niger 0.957 1.255 0.071 -1.894 -3.902 0.6740 36.243 37.433 36.10 2.0079 5.854 3.334 1416 0.144
Nigeria 1.628 -0.007 0.071 -0.311 3.576 2.3226 44.893 37.433 37.02 -3.8867 1.654 1.626 2223 0.055
Rwanda 1.646 2.093 0.071 0.132 2.026 2.1883 29.066 28.040 28.90 -1.8941 -2.596 1.369 1638 0.068
Senegal 1.316 0.779 0.071 -0.037 -1.503 3.8133 54.117 28.040 54.12 1.4659 2.487 1.345 1553 0.018
South Africa 1.699 0.540 0.071 -0.567 3.246 3.8650 61.060 22.486 62.30 -3.8132 -0.053 2.005 504 0.052
Tanzania 0.578 0.808 0.071 0.120 na na 38.102 37.433 38.10 na na 0.481 na na
Tunisia 4.320 1.226 0.071 2.469 4.492 5.5282 40.001 28.040 43.00 -2.0232 -1.188 -0.0367 593 0.016
Uganda 0.726 1.187 0.071 1.405 na 3.7523 40.740 28.040 33.00 na na -0.942 na na
Zambia 1.137 0.501 0.071 -2.793 0.591 0.8350 51.998 37.433 51.00 -3.3843 0.841 2.537 3954 -0.002
Zimbabwe 1.158 0.701 0.071 -0.707 3.262 3.0211 56.834 28.040 52.40 -3.9689 -1.127 1.654 1557 0.161
Bangladesh 1.627 0.913 0.071 2.055 -0.814 4.5599 38.976 37.433 35.21 2.8688 2.371 -0.250 na 0.000
China 3.340 0.725 0.071 8.028 3.189 10.1720 37.256 37.433 30.14 4.8387 5.651 -2.194 143 -0.013
India 2.130 1.780 0.071 3.217 1.731 5.4418 32.044 37.433 31.28 1.4852 -0.951 -3.595 120 0.020
Indonesia 10.55 3.329 0.071 5.349 4.275 7.6643 31.688 28.040 32.54 1.0744 -3.680 -7.256 277 0.029
Jordan 4.931 2.450 0.071 2.940 na 5.6461 40.656 22.486 38.04 na na -2.271 na na
Malaysia 3.096 1.168 0.071 4.815 4.325 8.2424 48.351 28.040 48.18 0.4899 -1.954 -2.526 217 0.014
Pakistan 4.686 0.940 0.071 2.711 2.362 5.0000 31.143 37.433 32.18 0.3483 2.464 -07391 183 0.007
Philippines 2.845 1.043 0.071 0.624 2.109 3.8902 46.665 28.040 45.91 -1.4849 0.645 2.194 505 0.004
Sri Lanka 6.509 2.079 0.071 3.224 2.979 6.4380 30.098 28.040 45.18 0.2449 0.317 -0.192 523 -0.029
Bolivia 2.340 0.675 0.071 0.106 -0.892 3.0969 42.038 28.040 42.04 0.9986 2.942 2.268 1067 0.015
Brazil 1.683 0.502 0.071 0.956 7.454 5.0058 60.662 22.486 56.93 -6.4987 -2.057 1.204 529 -0.005
Chile 2.264 0.911 0.071 3.537 0.754 7.7020 56.493 22.486 58.55 2.7831 1.578 -0.958 1484 -0.022
Colombia 2.426 0.568 0.071 2.064 3.209 5.8238 50.293 28.040 52.85 -1.1445 0.603 1.254 337 0.018
Costa Rica 2.751 0.782 0.071 0.934 3.878 4.1185 46.116 28.040 44.77 -2.9449 -0.284 2.020 300 -0.007
Dom. Rep. 2.535 0.961 0.071 1.446 5.335 4.7801 50.789 28.040 46.86 -3.8882 -2.593 1.144 766 0.001
El Salvador 2.463 1.455 0.071 0.235 1.093 3.6780 47.462 28.040 48.40 -0.8578 0.874 2.121 1549 0.020
Guatemala 1.772 0.481 0.071 0.190 3.345 4.0449 59.899 28.040 54.19 -3.1548 0.164 1.681 544 0.016
Honduras 1.729 0.953 0.071 0.513 1.371 4.6524 51.752 28.040 58.18 -0.8574 0.422 1.240 2439 0.007
Jamaica 4.912 2.348 0.071 -0.318 1.367 2.8077 37.916 28.040 43.94 -1.6849 1.703 5.659 261 0.057
Mexico 1.979 0.601 0.071 1.085 3.658 4.8394 55.278 22.486 52.78 -2.5730 -0.220 1.327 561 0.017
Nicaragua 1.428 1.024 0.071 -3.504 1.693 0.0757 50.072 28.040 50.32 -5.1973 -0.306 5.015 2156 0.115
Panama 1.783 0.662 0.071 1.421 4.043 5.1186 56.822 22.486 51.97 -2.6212 -0.892 0.842 na 0.177
Peru 3.265 1.784 0.071 -0.260 1.269 3.0157 45.106 22.486 46.05 -1.5295 1.000 3.729 1524 0.024
Trinidad** 2.612 0.701 0.071 0.325 2.238 3.2925 41.565 22.486 41.72 -1.9130 1.043 2.384 940 0.040
Venezuela 2.117 0.600 0.071 -0.478 0.425 2.6335 53.836 22.486 43.73 -0.9027 1.862 2.403 750 0.011
Notes:
1.  0 0 v q a = where v0 is multiplied by 1000 so that a and a0 are comparable in scale;  v q h e a - - = ) 1 ( , where estimates of q v0, e, h, and v are
obtained from Appendix Table B.1 (column for P1)
2. Estimates for b0 is obtained from the coefficient of G of regression 6 of Table 4.1.
3. g = average annual per capita GDP growth rate in the 1975-96
4. g0 = average annual per capita GDP growth rate in the 1965-74
5. G ” level of inequality in the 1975-96 period,
6. G0= level of inequality in the 1965-74 period
7.  0 0 0 G g gF b + = , where gF0 = average growth explained by non-distributional fundamentals in the 1965-74 period







- = F g G initial level of inequality (1965-74) consistent with steady state equilibrium ( 0
^ ^
= = p g ). The data in the column
reflect the median value  37.43 for the lower quartile,  28.04 for the second and third quartile, and  22.486 is the fourth quartile
(classification according to mean consumption)




a a + - = g p , where g is the average growth rate in the 1975-96 period
11.  0 0
^
0 a a + - = g p  where g0 is the average growth rate in 1965-74 period.
12. Confl4 = conflict variable (see footnote to Table 4.2)
13.  ) ( 74 65 96 75 - -
•
- = gcon gcon gcon34
Appendix Table D.2: Determinants of Growth Dynamics in Africa and Other Regions
(Annual Average in 1975-96 Relative to 1965-74)
Country/Region (1)






















Algeria -2.5260 -1.8384 -1.4193 1.4329 -1.2546 0.5533
Cote d’Ivoire -5.3623 -2.4989 -2.0185 1.1192 -0.3108 -1.6532
Egypt 2.3687 -1.0164 1.2809 1.3694 1.1362 -0.4014
Gabon -9.2698 -3.3360 -1.7641 1.1421 -0.6493 -4.6626
Guinea Bissau 0.1394 na -1.2977 1.8221 -0.1087 -0.2763
Kenya -3.9741 -3.0673 -0.8734 1.1887 -0.6830 -0.5390
Lesotho -2.8693 -3.1149 -0.1151 2.2323 -1.3706 -0.5010
Madagascar -3.2995 -0.2843 -2.2214 0.6219 -0.1156 -1.3002
Mauritania 0.6764 -1.2354 -1.7157 1.4915 -0.7224 2.8585
Mauritius 2.1545 -0.1884 0.7580 2.3471 -0.1454 -0.6167
Morocco -1.5918 -0.2826 -0.1350 1.6212 -1.0183 -1.7771
Niger 2.0079 -0.9742 -1.9233 0.5801 -2.2827 6.6080
Nigeria -3.8867 -1.5291 na na -0.8788 na
Rwanda -1.8941 -1.1266 -0.4735 0.5546 -1.0843 0.2356
Senegal 1.4659 -1.0683 -1.2497 1.2339 -0.2854 2.8354
South Africa -3.8132 -0.3468 -2.6892 2.2551 -0.8271 -2.2052
Tunisia -2.0232 -0.4080 -0.7633 2.5186 -0.2539 -3.1166
Zambia -3.3843 -2.7199 -3.6647 1.6381 0.0282 1.3340
Zimbabwe -3.9689 -1.0713 -1.7088 1.1735 -2.5645 0.2022
Africa  (median) -2.5260 -1.0989 -1.3585 1.4012 -0.68297 -0.7867
Bangladesh 2.87 na -0.353 -1.019 na na
China 4.8387 -0.0984 9.0749 -4.5905 0.2048 0.248
India 1.4852 -0.0828 1.4756 -2.2287 -0.3163 2.637
Indonesia 1.07 -0.190 1.614 na -0.460 na
Jordan na -0.189 0.671 -1.674 na na
Malaysia 0.4899 -0.1495 1.5664 0.2093 -0.2182 -0.918
Pakistan 0.3483 -0.1256 -1.6443 2.0803 -0.1138 0.152
Philippines -1.4849 -0.3471 -1.6087 -0.1820 -0.0649 0.718
Sri Lanka 0.2449 -0.3597 0.0670 0.4431 0.4600 -0.365
Asia (median)*                 0.4191               -0.1376                         0.7713            -0.01365                              -0.0894 0.1117
Bolivia 0.9986 -0.7342 -2.4346 -2.8858 -0.2333 7.2865
Brazil -6.4987 -0.3636 -1.9376 1.8834 0.0829 -6.1639
Chile 2.7831 -1.0210 0.7970 -0.5235 0.3460 3.1845
Columbia -1.1445 -0.2319 -1.5450 0.2842 -0.2803 0.6284
Costa Rica -2.9449  -0.2066 -1.9765 -1.3170 0.1166 0.4386
Dom. Rep. -3.8882 -0.5272 -0.9541 1.1181 -0.0186 -3.5064
El Salvador -0.8578 -1.0652 -1.0076 -1.1957 -0.3239 2.7346
Guatemala -3.1548 -0.3743 -2.5953 1.6763 -0.2483 -1.6132
Honduras -0.8574 -1.6776 -0.8715 0.3237 -0.1176 1.4856
Jamaica -1.6849 -0.1794 -1.6278 -1.1337 -0.9118 2.1679
Mexico -2.5730 -0.3862 -1.8535 1.1568 -0.2652 -1.2249
Nicaragua -5.1973 -1.4834 -3.5341 -1.9172 -1.8286 3.5660
Peru -1.5295 -1.0485 -1.5797 -0.2951 -0.3891 1.7829
Trinidad** -1.9130 -0.6469 -2.4540 2.3891 -0.6425 -0.5587
Venezuela -0.9027 -0.5158 -2.9010 0.7346 -0.1786 1.9581
Latin America (median) -1.68485 -0.5272 -1.8535 0.2842 -0.24833 0.6600
Source: Table 4.2, Appendix Table D.1, equation (9)
Notes:
g= average annual per capita growth rate in the 1975-96
g0=average annual per capita growth rate in 1965-74
Effect due to shocks and social conflicts = G I) 1 ( 1 - - t l = -l1*confl4 (see notes to Table 4.2), where l1=0.00069
Effect due to equitable initial income distribution =  ) ( 0
~
0 2 0 G G - l b , where  0
~
G  is given by the appropriate median for the country in question
(see Appendix D.1.) where b0=0.071 and l2=0.72405






l  where a and  0 ˆ P are as in Appendix Table D.1.
Effect due to macroeconomic policy = 
•
·gcon 3 l , where 88385 . 15 3 - = l  and 
•
gcon as in Appendix Table D.1* Bangladesh, Indonesia and
Jordan are excluded.35
Appendix Table D.3: Dynamics of Poverty in Africa and Other Regions (Predicted annual
average change in Poverty for 1975-1996)
Country Growth = -ag a0 P ˆ
Algeria -0.0966 4.3443 4.248
Botswana* -4.0807 1.1154 -2.965
Cote d’Ivoire 2.0218 2.6734 4.695
Egypt -13.5084 7.0028 -6.506
Gabon 0.8002 1.7183 2.519
Guinea -0.7997 0.5728 -0.227
Guinea Bissau -0.1953 0.6746 0.479
Kenya -0.2735 0.9609 0.687
Lesotho -1.4212 1.4970 0.076
Madagascar 1.8751 0.7421 2.617
Mauritania 0.2108 1.3521 1.563
Mauritius -6.0009 4.5434 -1.458
Morocco -4.1162 4.4835 0.367
Niger 2.3773 0.9565 3.334
Nigeria -0.0022 1.6283 1.626
Rwanda -0.2770 1.6458 1.369
Senegal 0.0287 1.3160 1.345
South Africa 0.3061 1.6989 2.005
Tanzania 0.1454 0.578 0.481
Tunisia -3.0273 4.3199 -0.0367
Uganda -1.6673 0.7256 -0.942
Zambia 1.4001 1.1370 2.537
Zimbabwe 0.4951 1.1585 1.654
Africa -0.1459 1.4245 1.345
 Bangladesh -1.8772 1.6272 -0.250
 China 5.8174 3.3398 -2.194
 India -5.7249 2.1302 -3.595
 Indonesia -17.8060 10.5502 -7.256
 Jordan -7.2025 4.9311 -2.271
 Malaysia -5.6219 3.0959 -2.526
 Pakistan -2.5494 4.6857 -07391
 Philippines -0.6510 2.8449 2.194
 Sri Lanka -6.7010 6.5091 -0.192
 Asia -5.6219 3.3398 -2.271
 Bolivia -0.0716 2.3398 2.268
 Brazil -0.4796 1.6834 1.204
 Chile -3.2220 2.2644 -0.958
 Columbia -1.1724 2.4260 1.254
 Costa Rica -0.7304 2.7506 2.020
 Dom. Rep. -1.3903 2.5345 1.144
 El Salvador -0.3416 2.4631 2.121
 Guatemala -0.0912 1.7722 1.681
 Honduras -0.4895 1.7292 1.240
 Jamaica 0.7472 4.9118 5.659
 Mexico -0.6521 1.9787 1.327
 Nicaragua 3.5869 1.4276 5.015
 Panama -0.9405 1.7830 0.842
 Peru 0.4645 3.2649 3.729
 Trinidad -0.2276 2.6121 2.384
 Venezuela -0.4796 2.1165 2.403
 L. America -0.4796 2.3021 1.8505
Source: Appendix Table D.1 and equation (10)
Notes:
1.  v q h e a - - = ) 1 ( reflect the elasticity of the growth effect on poverty net of the influence of inequality operating through the growth channel
(Appendix Table D.1.).
2. a0 = component of change in poverty due to distribution (Appendix Table D.1.)
3. g= average annual growth rate in 1975-96 (Appendix Table D.1).
4.  0 ˆ a a + - = g P (from Appendix Table D.1)36
Appendix Table D.4: Predicted Performance in the Post 1975:Behaviour of Poverty,
Growth and Distribution
Country g & G gF G
~




< 0 ˆ > P 0 ˆ < P
Algeria -0.0186 39.2813 3.0870 24.26 2.155 X X X
Botswana 0.4380 54.2085 9.5349 36.90 -3.025 X X X
Cote d’Ivoire* -0.0498 36.8926 1.6108 22.62 3.685 X X X
Egypt -0.1791 32.0057 6.0978 36.90 -1.351 X X X
Gabon -0.6891 62.8718 4.2314 24.26 2.815 X X X
Guinea 0.3354 46.8700 4.9185 40.93 0.124 X X X
Guinea Bissau -0.0461 56.1678 4.6553 40.93 0.529 X X X
Kenya 0.2112 57.8910 4.6197 40.93 0.707 X X X
Lesotho 1.2555 56.0109 7.2812 36.90 -0.638 X X X
Madagascar 0.0189 43.4587 1.1146 40.93 2.613 X X X
Mauritania 0.4499 42.5346 2.6514 36.90 2.775 X X X
Mauritius** 0.2400 36.5548 6.8509 96.25 -1.284 X X X
Morocco 0.2878 39.2002 5.0707 36.90 0.285 X X X
Niger 0.2673 36.2425 0.8220 40.93 2.397 X X X
Nigeria 0.5518 44.8928 2.3346 40.93 1.270 X X X
Rwanda 0.5904 29.0658 2.9101 36.90 2.308 X X X
Senegal -0.0781 54.1173 3.7643 36.90 2.483 X X X
South Africa 0.0954 61.0600 3.7731 24.26 2.648 X X X
Tanzania 0.0680 38.1023 2.8305 40.93 0.481 X X X
Tunisia 0.0255 40.0013 5.1804 36.90 -0.107 X X X
Uganda*** 0.1965 40.7400 5.2394 40.93 0.993 X X X
Zambia 0.4443 51.9982 1.3863 40.93 3.037 X X X
Zimbabwe 0.4730 56.8337 3.9649 36.90 3.175 X X
Bangladesh 0.3301 38.9758 4.8540 40.93 -0.413 X X X
China 0.1331 37.2560 10.2844 40.93 -4.664 X X X
India -0.0603 32.0436 5.5540 40.93 -1.240 X X X
Indonesia 0.1130 31.6877 7.4742 36.90 -3.083 X X X
Jordan -0.0956 40.6564 5.4433 24.26 -0.180 X X X
Malaysia** 0.3634 48.3505 7.9309 111.44 -2.531 X X X
Pakistan 0.0569 31.1428 5.2660 40.93 -0.880 X X X
Philippines 0.0261 46.6650 4.0926 36.90 1.800 X X X
Sri Lanka -0.0845 30.0980 5.4566 36.90 -0.887 X X X
Bolivia 0.2426 42.0378 2.4412 36.90 2.335 X X X
Brazil -0.0660 60.6624 5.7386 24.26 1.420 X X X
Chile** 0.8983 56.4927 7.6817 107.94 -0.661 X X X
Columbia 0.0091 50.2926 5.5090 36.90 0.312 X X X
Costa Rica -0.0670 46.1160 4.1034 36.90 1.480 X X X
Dom. Rep. 0.1349 50.7888 5.2577 36.90 0.950 X X X
El Salvador -0.0396 47.4619 3.2543 36.90 2.202 X X X
Guatemala 0.0481 59.8991 4.6342 36.90 2.248 X X X
Honduras 0.0575 51.7519 4.3309 36.90 1.914 X X X
Jamaica -0.0343 37.9159 2.1540 36.90 2.773 X X X
Mexico 0.1347 55.2783 4.8068 24.26 1.316 X X X
Nicaragua 1.3335 50.0717 0.8606 36.90 6.065 X X X
Panama 0.0919 56.8215 4.9116 24.26 1.045 X X X
Peru 0.0045 45.1065 2.9385 24.26 2.400 X X X
Trinidad -0.0771 41.5652 4.5341 24.26 1.929 X X X
Venezuela -0.0917 53.8359 3.0181 24.26 2.575 X X X
Notes:
g = average annual growth, 1975-1996
g & = average annual change for the rate of growth for 1975-96
G= level of Inequality in 1975-76







- = F g G ; where  the parameters are obtained from Appendix Table D.1. The data in the column reflects the median value 24.26 for
fourth quartile, 36.9 for second quartile and 40.93 for the lower quartile (Classification according to mean consumption)
*-since  G G
~
@ (median), in this case G is compared to the Country-Specific  G
~
,  which is smaller at  about 23.
**-Actual G’s are compared to country- specific  s G'
~
 rather than the corresponding quartile median  s G'
~
. This is because for those countries
individual  s G'
~
are much larger than the median  s G'
~
: Mauritius (96); Malaysia(111); and Chile (108), perhaps due to this very high share of
growth explained by non-distributional fundamentals ( G
~
is positively associated with gF    )
**- for Uganda, actual G is compared to the median  G
~
for the lower quartile rather than the middle quartile as the computed mean consumption
would suggest. This is because the latter is not consistent with classification based on mean income.